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authority to use the unit clarification procedure to merge bargaining
units, and although the Third Circuit has specifically upheld this au-
thority in Glass Workers, the Board has avoided using it. It remains
an open, and interesting, question whether the Board will exercise its
statutory authority to merge bargaining units when an appropriate case
is presented to it, or whether its 1968 Libbey-Owens-Ford decision will
become an isolated aberration.
The answer to this question may lie in the composition of the
Board." At present, none of the three members of the majority in the
original Libbey-Owens-Ford case remains on the Board. Of their re-
placements, Member Kennedy agreed with their position that the
Board possesses and should exercise the authority to consolidate bar-
gaining units in an appropriate unit clarification proceeding;" it can
be assumed that he will adhere to this position. A second new member,
Chairman Miller, contended in his concurring opinion in the final
Libbey-Owens-Ford case that consolidation of units should be a matter
left to collective bargaining. Presumably, he also will not change his
position." Member Penello has not yet expressed an opinion on the
consolidation of units in a unit clarification. Members Fanning and
Jenkins, who dissented in the original Libbey-Owens-Ford case, are
still on the Board. As they demonstrated in the final Libbey-Owens-
Ford case, they had not, as of that time, changed their position that
the Board does not have the authority to merge bargaining units in a
unit clarification proceeding. It will be interesting to note whether, in
light of the Third Circuit's Glass Workers decision, these two members
will choose to exercise this court-sanctioned authority in an appropriate
case." Their views, along with that of Member Penello, will be decisive
in determining the future position of the Board on merger of existing
units through unit clarification.
MICHAEL D. MALFITANO
Administrative Law—Federal Trade Commission—Lack of Author-
ity to Promulgate Trade Regulation Rules Having the Effect of Law
—National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion.1 —Plaintiff, a representative of the petroleum industry, brought this
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
85 See note 83 supra.
88
 Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 189 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 76 L.R.R.M. 1806, 1808 (1971)
(dissenting opinion).
81 In Denver, Salt Lake & Pacific Stages, Inc., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 175, 81 L.R.R.M.
1085 (1972), decided after Glass Workers, Chairman Miller specifically reiterated his
position. Id. at —, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1086 (concurring opinion).
88 In the sole merger case since the Glass Workers decision, Member Jenkins con-
curred in dismissing the petition. The combined unit was not shown appropriate. Id. at
—, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1085 & n.4. Member Fanning was not on the paneL
1 340 F. Supp. 1343 (D.D.C. 1972).
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challenging the statutory authority of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) to issue Trade Regulation Rules.2 It was a case of first impres-
sion, no other courts having considered the issue on its merits .° The
particular rule in question4 states that failure to post specified octane
numbers on gasoline pumps at service stations constitutes an "unfair
method of competition" and an "unfair or deceptive act or practice"
within the proscription of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA). °
The FTC has claimed the authority to issue such rules since 1964,
when it promulgated the first Trade Regulation Rule, one which con-
cerned the advertising and labeling of cigarettes. The rationale for
that claim was fully set out in the Statement of Basis and Purpose
of Trade Regulation Rule° (hereinafter 1964 Statement of Basis)
that accompanied the 1964 Rule. In that Statement of Basis, the FTC
2
 Trade Regulation Rules are defined as follows:
(a) Nature and authority. For the purpose of carrying out the provisions of
the statutes administered by it, the Commission is empowered to promulgate
rules and regulations applicable to unlawful trade practices. Such rules and regu-
lations (hereinafter called "trade regulation rules") express the experience and
judgment of the Commission, based on facts of which it has knowledge derived
from studies, reports, investigations, hearings, and other proceedings, or within
official notice, concerning the substantive requirements of the statutes which it
administers.
(b) Scope. Trade regulation rules may cover all applications of a particular
statutory provision and may be nationwide in effect, or they may be limited to
particular areas or industries or to particular product or geographic markets, as
may be appropriate.
(c) Use of rules in adjudicative proceedings. Where a trade regulation rule is
relevant to any issue involved in an adjudicative proceeding thereafter instituted,
the Commission may rely upon the rule to resolve such issue, provided that
the respondent shall have been given a fair hearing on the applicability of the
rule to the particular case.
16 C.F.R. § 1.12 (Supp. 1972). The procedure for the promulgation of these rules is set
forth in 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.15-.16 (Supp. 1972).
8
 Two suits, which challenged the legality of proposed rules, were dismissed on the
ground that they were not ripe for adjudication. In the first case the District of
Columbia Circuit held: "The rulemaking authority of an agency cannot usually be fairly
tested in the absence of a specific legal and factual setting." Bristol-Meyers Co. v. FTC,
424 F.2d 935, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The second case adopted the standards enunciated
by the Supreme Court for determining the ripeness of such a suit: the issues must be
fit for judicial decision, and there must be the possibility of hardship to the parties if
court consideration is denied at the time. Lever Bros. Co, v. FTC, 325 F. Supp. 371,
373-74 (D. Me. 1971).
4 The rule provides in pertinent part:
In connection with the sale or consignment of motor gasoline for general
automotive use, .. , it constitutes an unfair method of competition and an
unfair or deceptive act or practice for refiners or others who sell to retailers,
when such refiners or other distributors own or lease the pumps through which
motor gasoline is dispensed to the consuming public, to fail to disclose clearly
and conspicuously in a permanent manner on the pumps the minimum octane
number or numbers of the motor gasoline being dispensed . . . .
16 C.F.R. 422.1 (Supp. 1972).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. (1970).
0 Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325,
8365-73 (1964).
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argued that the Trade Regulation Rules are the product of a valid
exercise of statutory authority as granted in two provisions of the
FTCA: first, Section 6(g), 7 which explicitly mentions the making of
rules and regulations; second, Section 5(a) (6),8 the general purpose
section of the Act, which according to the FTC implies the requisite
rule-making authority. The Statement of Basis accompanying the Rule
that precipitated National Petroleum relied upon the rationale of the
1964 Statement of Basis.° The validity of this rationale, then, was
the issue before the National Petroleum court, and the court rejected
both of its elements. Following a thorough analysis of the legislative
history of the relevant section of the FTCA, the court refused either
to accept the Commission's interpretation of the explicit rule-making
section or to allow the Commission to infer an implied rule-making
authority from the general purpose provision of the Act. The district
court therefore granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
and HELD: "[T]he statute (FTCA) does not confer upon the Fed-
eral Trade Commission the authority to promulgate Trade Regulation
Rules that have the effect of substantive law.'".°
This casenote will examine the treatment by the court of the
Commission's two primary arguments supporting its assertion that it
possesses the statutory authority requisite for the promulgation of
Trade Regulation Rules. The note will then focus on what it consid-
ers a fundamental issue, one not directly considered by the court:
whether or not the rules do indeed have the effect of law. A resolution
of that issue appears essential because both the reasoning and the
holding of the court are based sub silentio on the premise that the
Rules do have the effect of law—that is, that they are what are com-
monly known as "legislative" rules." To determine whether this pre-
mise is valid, a brief preliminary examination will be made of the
nature of legislative rules. The note will then attempt to delineate the
nature and effect of Trade Regulation Rules by examining the 1964
Statement of Basis, which describes the effect the FTC intends the
Rules to be given at its adjudicative hearings. It will be submitted
that the Rules must be classified as legislative due to the conclusive
effect which will be given at the hearings to the factual conclusions
that are inherent in the Rules. For example, underlying the Rule in
the instant case are factual conclusions regarding the buying habits
of the consuming public in connection with different grades of gaso-
7 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1970).
8 15 U.S.C.	 45(a)(6) (1970).
Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule, 36 Fed. Reg. 354, 365-66
(1971).
10 340 F. Supp. at 1350.
11 Pursuant to the holding that an FTC rule is unauthorized if it has the effect of
substantive law, but without any express determination that the challenged rule had
that effect, the court issued an order declaring the rule null and void. Order filed, Na-
tional Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, Civil No. 1180-71 (D.D.C., filed Apr. 4, 1972).
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line;" a respondent who is summoned to a hearing for an alleged
violation of the Rule would not be permitted to offer evidence in
rebuttal of these conclusions. Finally, an evaluation of this effect in
terms of its impact on procedural rights will be made in order to
underline the correctness of the National Petroleum court's require-
ment that rules having such an impact be authorized by a clear dele-
gation of power from Congress.
The National Petroleum court rejected the assertion that the
FTC is statutorily authorized to issue rules having the effect of sub-
stantive law. The first basis of authority upon which the Commission
relied is Section 6(g) of the FTCA, the only provision which explicitly
mentions rules and regulations:
The Commission shall also have the power—.. .
From time to time to classify corporations and to make rules
and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions
of sections 41 to 46 and 47 to 58 of this title."
The court determined exactly what is embraced by the words "rules
and regulations" by first turning to an analysis of the legislative his-
tory of this section of the Act." The Commission claimed in the 1964
Statement of Basis that there is no need to resort to such an analysis
since the meaning of this provision is plain on its face." In other
words, since the word "rules" is used without qualification, it may be
deemed to refer not only to procedural rules, which merely explain
the procedures by which the Commission follows in applying the law,
but also to substantive rules, which pertain to the law that the Com-
mission administers.
There are strong reasons, however, for not construing the grant
of power in section 6(g) so as to include both types of rules. First of
all, it is a well-established principle that statutory language must be
interpreted according to its context." The rule-making clause in sec-
tion 6(g) is located side-by-side with the grant of a procedural power
to classify corporations, within section 6, which delineates the Com-
mission's investigative powers." Thus the context in which the words
"rules and regulations" are placed casts doubt upon the proposition
that the rules may govern more than simple procedural matters con-
12 See note 92 infra.
15 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
14 340 F. Sup!). at 1345-48.
10 1964 Statement of Basis, supra note 6, at 8369 & n.143.
10
 2 J. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 4703 (3d ed. 1943) (hereinafter cited
as Sutherland).
17
 The different subsections of section 6 concern the following matters, in order:
(a) investigation of corporations; (b) reports by corporations; (c) investigation of com-
pliance with antitrust decrees; (d) investigations of violations of antitrust statutes; (e)
readjustment of corporations violating antitrust statutes; (f) publication of information
and reports; (g) classification of corporations and regulations; (h) investigations of
foreign trade conditions and reports. 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1970).
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sequent to the Commission's investigative powers. Another method of
interpreting statutory language is to compare the particular passage
with those of other statutes wherein Congress delegates the disputed
power.' The simple, brief and unqualified wording of section 6(g)
contrasts sharply with the cautious delegation of substantive rule-
making power to other administrative agencies, notably the Securities
Exchange Commission (SEC)," the Federal Power Commission
(FPC),2° and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)." In
each of these statutes, Congress expressed its intent clearly and defi-
nitely within carefully drawn limits. The plain statement that the
FTC is empowered to make "rules and regulations" for the purpose
of carrying out the provisions of the Act is not sufficient on its face
to confer the far-reaching power to make substantive rules such as the
Trade Regulation Rules. Both from the context of the rule-making
clause and from comparison with other statutes, then, it is not at all
obvious that the words "rules and regulations" should encompass sub-
stantive as well as procedural rules. Something more than a casual
interpretation of those words as all-inclusive is required to establish
clearly the intent of Congress in drafting section 6(g).
In National Petroleum, the Commission asked the court to round
out the contours of section 6(g) with the definition of "rule" pro-
pounded in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)." This Act ap-
plies generally to all administrative agencies and governs the different
procedures employed by those agencies. It defines "rule" as the "whole
or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice require-
ments of an agency ...."23 In short, the APA regards the term "rules"
as a generic one including both substantive and procedural rules. The
National Petroleum court refused to look to the APA definition because
there is no cross reference or other legal relationship between "rules"
as used in the FTCA and "rules" as defined by the APA.24 Further-
more, the first sentence of the definitions section of the APA states
specifically that the definitions are for the purpose of the APA." The
fact that the APA defines "rules" as meaning either substantive or
procedural for the purposes of that Act does not imply that wherever
Congress authorizes an agency to make "rules," the agency may re-
gard itself as authorized to promulgate both kinds of rules according
to its whim.
Since, then, neither the FTCA nor the APA provided any assis-
18
 2 Sutherland, supra note 16, § 6102.
18 15 U.S.C.	 79(t) (1970).
20 15 U.S.C. § 717(o) (1970).
21 47 U.S.C.	 303(r) (1970).
22 340 F. Supp. at 1348.
23 5 U.S.C. § 551(d) (1970).
24 340 F. Supp. at 1348.
25 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1970).
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tance in defining the term "rules" as used in Section 6(g) of the
FTCA, the court turned to legislative history to resolve the important
question of how broadly the Commission might construe the term.
Specifically, does the term include substantive rules by which the FTC
may define with particularity "unfair methods of competition" and
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices" within the meaning of the
FTCA," or is the term confined to procedural rules by which the
FTC may conduct its investigations and adjudications? 27
When first proposed in the House of Representatives, the FTCA
contained a clause strikingly similar to that of Section 6(g)." At that
time the House regarded the proposed Commission as purely an in-
vestigative body functioning at the direction of the President, the
Attorney General, or either house of Congress." The Senate did not
act on this bill, but provided its own version," which set forth a differ-
ent purpose for the Commission, namely, to sit as an adjudicative
body for the hearing of antitrust violations.' The Senate bill, how-
ever, conspicuously omitted any provision conferring the power to
make rules and regulations either in an investigative or adjudicative
context." Although the House regarded the FTC as an investigative
agency with severely limited rule-making power, the Senate envisioned
an agency which would adjudicate in roughly the same manner as the
courts." A Conference Committee was appointed to resolve these dif-
ferences. The Committee proposed a bill which incorporated substantial
28
 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970).
27 The word "substantive," as used in this note, is used in contrast to "procedural."
However, it should not be confused with "substantial" or "having the effect of law."
Substantive rules may or may not have the effect of law. Those substantive rules that
have the effect of law are classified as "legislative"; those that do not are termed
"interpretative." See text accompanying notes 57-63 infra.
28 
"[TIhe commission may from time to time make rules and regulations and
classifications of corporations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this
act. ..." H.R. 15613, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. § 8 (1914).
29
 H.R. 15613, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. § 10 (1914); H.R. Rep. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1914). See 51 Cong. Rec. 8845 (remarks of Judge Covington), 9047-48 (remarks
of Representatives Towner and Stevens) (1914).
80 Federal Trade Commission Bill, Comparative Print, S. Doc. No. 573, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914).
81 Id., { 5.
82 See note 30 supra.
88
 The bill provided that the FTC was to proceed in the following manner when
it believed any person, partnership or corporation was violating the provisions of the
proposed Act: the defendant had to be served with a complaint stating the charges and
giving notice of a hearing; the defendant had a right to appear at the hearing and show
cause why an order should not be entered; upon such hearing the FTC was to make and
file its findings; if the FTC found the defendant guilty of the violations charged, it
was to enter its findings of record and serve upon the defendant an order requiring the
latter to cease and desist from the violations found. Federal Trade Commission Bill,
Comparative Print, S. Doc. No. 573, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1914). This procedure
was incorporated into the FTCA in substantially the same form. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)
(1970). It should be noted that the FTC's sole power lies in the issuance of cease-and-
desist orders, enforceable only upon the FTC's application to the courts.
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parts of the Senate and House bills.' The National Petroleum court
reasoned that since neither the Senate nor the House intended to grant
the FTC the explicit power to make rules of a substantive nature, the
rule-making power which was inserted in the Conference bill could not
exceed the limited power enunciated in the House bill." Thus, the
court ruled, section 6(g) pertains only to housekeeping or procedural
matters.8°
Furthermore, amendments expressly granting the FTC precisely
the power it seeks to exercise in its use of the Trade Regulation Rules
were proposed when the House bill was before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce" and when the bill was debated
on the House floor," but they were roundly rejected. When the Con-
ference bill was subsequently before the House, two members of the
Conference Committee explained the bill and made comments which
lend further support to the position that the FTC was not intended to
have substantive rule-making power." Finally, Congress itself has
recognized the lack of authority in the FTC to promulgate substantive
rules having the effect of law by explicitly conferring this very authority
on the Commission in certain narrow commercial areas only, such as
textiles, furs and labeling.°
Thus, the court concluded, an impartial reading of the legislative
history of the FTCA clearly indicates that Section 6(g) confers upon
the FTC only the limited authority to make rules and regulations in
84
 Conference Rep. No. 1142, 51 Cong. Rec. 14919 (1914).
88
 340 F. Supp. at 1345-46 n.12.
88
 Id. at 1346. The FTC, however, has also relied upon section 6(g) to support the
issuance of rules which, though lacking in force of law, are nonetheless substantive to
the extent that the rules interpret the FTCA. Industry Guides and Trade Practice Rules,
16 C.F.R. §§ 17.1-.4 (Supp. 1972).
87
 The amendment before the Committee provided that the FTC be given the
power to "make, alter, or repeal regulations further defining more particularly unfair
trade practices or unfair or oppressive competition." H.R. Rep. No. 533, 63d Cong., 2d
.
Sess., pt. 3, at 21 (1914) (emphasis supplied).
88
 "[T]he commission is hereby empowered to make all necessary rules, regulations,
orders and decrees for the enforcement of the powers herein granted, and the rules,
regulations, orders and decrees . . . shall be binding and conclusive ... ." 51 Cong. Rec.
9056 (1914) (amendment offered by Representative Dillon) (emphasis supplied).
89
 "The Federal trade commission will have no power to prescribe the methods of
competition to be used in future. In issuing its orders it will not be exercising power of
a legislative nature." 51 Cong. Rec. 14932 (1914) (remarks of Judge Covington, so-called
author of the FTCA). "We desired clearly to exclude that authority [to exercise a
legislative function such as is exercised by the Interstate Commerce Commission] from
the power of the commission. We do not know as we could grant it anyway." Id. at
14938 (remarks of Representative Stevens).
40 Labeling of Word Products Act I 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 68d(a) (1970); Textile Fiber
Products Identification Act § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 70e(c) (1970); Labeling of Fur Products
Act § 8(b), 15 U.S.C. 69f(b) (1970) ; Flammable Fabrics Act § 5(c), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1194(c) (1970) ; Fair Packaging and Labeling Program Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1454
(1970). It should also be noted that the Flammable Fabrics Act was once phrased in
the same terms as Section 6(g) of the FTCA, yet Congress felt the need 'to spell out the
delegation of substantive rule-making power in a subsequent amendment. 340 F. Supp. at
1348; H.R. Rep. No. 972, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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connection with housekeeping chores and investigative responsibilities."
The only section of the Act which explicitly mentions rule-making
power cannot be cited as a basis of authority for Trade Regulation
Rules.
The FTC, however, did not depend in National Petroleum solely
on the wording of Section 6(g), but argued that even if this explicit
wording is an insufficient basis for the authority claimed, the central
purpose of the FTCA implies the power to promulgate rules having the
effect of substantive law. This second alleged basis of authority is
contained in the general purpose provision of section 5 (a) (6):
The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent .. .
unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce."
Thus, argued the FTC, the Commission may infer from section 5(a) (6)
all necessary powers to fulfill this congressional mandate.
The court provided a short answer to this argument, noting that
the Commission ignored section 5(b), which immediately follows sec-
tion 5 (a) (6) ." Section 5 (b) sets out the adjudicative process which
the FTC is required to follow when it issues a cease-and-desist order.
Hence, the court concluded, "General rules of statutory construction
and the scheme of the FTCA itself demonstrate that the mandate of
Section 5 (a) (6) is to be carried out by means of adjudicative process
specified in Section 5(b)."" Further, if the legislative history of the
Act, as previously discussed, demonstrates that Congress specifically
meant to withhold substantive rule-making power from the explicit
delegation in Section 6(g), such power cannot be based upon an implied
grant."
The principal case cited by the Commission which permits the
promulgation of rules that have the effect of law based upon authority
implied by the relevant statute is National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States." In that case the FCC had issued several regulations of an
antitrust nature which governed the relations between licensed broad-
casting stations and network organizations. Failure to comply with the
FCC regulations justified revocation of the offending station's license.
The Federal Communications Act contained a specific rule-making
clause, but it was not immediately apparent that it included rules of
such scope and force." Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the
41 340 F. Supp. at 1348-49.
42 13 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970).
48 Respectively, 15 U.S.C.
	 45(a)(6), 45(b) (1970). 340 F. Supp. at 1349.
44 Id.
46 Id.
40 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (cited in 1964 Statement of Basis, supra note 6, at 8373).
47
 See note 123 infra. This was the same clause later involved in United States v.
Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), discussed in text at notes 114-19 infra.
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power to promulgate these particular regulations was implied by the
general purpose provision" of the Act."
The National Petroleum court distinguished that case from the
instant case on the grounds that neither the statutory scheme nor the
legislative histOry involved in National Broadcasting clearly negated
an implied grant of legislative power. 5° An additional reason can be
posited for distinguishing the two cases: the FCC, unlike the FTC,
is charged with the duty of licensing, 51 which necessarily entails a great
deal of discretion." In contrast, the principal role of the FTC is to
adjudicate alleged violations of the law it administers." Because the
Commission is not involved in a highly discretionary field such as
licensing, but in the application of law through adjudication, the powers
it may marshal to perform its duty must be strictly construed to protect
the procedural rights of respondents.
Having rejected the Commission's arguments, the court held that
the FTC does not have the necessary legislative authority to issue
substantive rules that have the effect of law." It should be noted that
not all substantive rules were found unauthorized, but only those hav-
ing the effect of law. In short, the holding assumed as a premise that
the Trade Regulation Rules are in fact rules which have the effect of
law," but the court did not discuss this assumption in its opinion."
It is submitted that the court correctly perceived that the nature and
effect of the Rules are such that they must be characterized as legisla-
tive rules. The remainder of this note will seek to articulate grounds
supporting this premise of the court's by delineating the nature and
effect of the Trade Regulation Rules. It is necessary, then, first to dis-
tinguish between substantive rules that have the effect of law ("legis-
lative" rules) and those that do not ("interpretative" rules), and
second to establish in what way the proposed Trade Regulation Rules
have the effect of law.
A "legislative" rule is the product of an exercise of legislative
power delegated by the legislature to an administrative body." For
that reason it
 has the effect of law immediately upon promulgation."
48 47 U.S.C. 1303 (1970).
49 319 U.S. at 224.
5° 340 F. Supp. at 1349 & n.32.
51
 47 U.S.C. 4 301 (1970).
62 See 319 U.S. at 224-27.
53
 340 F. Supp. at 1349.
54
 Id. at 1350.
55 See note 11 supra.
66
 There are two indirect references that imply the assumption. The court expresses
the fear that the FTC, through promulgation of such rules, would circumvent the ex-
tensive due process procedures in Section 5 of. the Act. 340 F. Supp. at 1346. Also, in
denying the FTC's claim of implied authority, the court quotes a passage from a law
review article which states that the FTC is limited to the promulgation of purely inter-
pretative rules that are open to full-scale judicial review. Id. at 1349 n.32.
57
 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 5.03, at 299 (1958) (hereinafter cited
as Davis).
58 Id.
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In contrast, an "interpretative" rule is a clarification or explanation
of existing laws or regulations." In short, legislative rules create law
whereas interpretative rules are statements by an administrative agency
as to what the agency thinks a statute means.°' Because legislative rules,
like legislation, have the effect of law, thereby binding the courts in
the application thereof, the courts usually require promulgation of such
rules to be based upon a clear delegation of rule-making power."' In
comparison, interpretative rules . may influence a court's decision and,
in that limited sense only, have the "effect of law," but they cannot
bind the court." They are merely interpretations, and an agency is not
required to possess specific statutory authority to issue them."
It is not readily apparent whether the instant Trade Regulation
Rules are interpretative or legislative. In the 1964 Statement of Basis,
the Commission hedged in confronting the question, stating simply that
the rules fit neither pigeonhole exactly." It would appear that the FTC
sensed that it lacked the requisite statutory authority to promulgate
legislative rules, for it stated: "Trade regulation rules are not legisla-
tive in the sense of adding new substantive rights or obligations." 05
The Commission further admitted that Trade Regulation Rules do not
have the force and effect of law and that "the legislative history [of the
FTCA] suggests that the Commission was not intended to promulgate
`legislative' rules."' Arguably, then, these statements, if taken alone,
remove the rules from the ambit of the National Petroleum holding,
which denies the FTC only the authority to promulgate rules that have
the effect of law. On the other hand, the Commission will not allow its
rules to be characterized as merely advisory or interpretative rules. The
Commission insisted that "where a rule correctly expresses the require-
ments of the law, one who disobeys the rule is, for all practical purposes,
59 See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 44 F. Supp. 603, 607 (E.D.
Wash. 1942).
69
 Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; Continental Oil
Co. v. Burns, 317 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D. Del. 1970). As written, the APA does not
distinguish between legislative and interpretative rules. However, the Senate Committee
which considered the Act did address this point: "'interpretative' rules—as merely inter-
pretations of statutory provisions—are subject to review, whereas 'substantive' rules
involve a maximum of administrative discretion." Senate Committee Print, S. Doc. No.
248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946). As used by the Committee, "substantive" is
synonymous with "legislative." See note 27 supra.
el See note 57 supra.
62 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
68 "In addition to the power to enact legally binding regulations conferred upon
many of the agencies, all of them may, if they wish, issue interpretations, rulings, or
opinions upon the laws they administer, without statutory authorization to do so." Final
Report of the Attorney General on Administrative Procedure 99-100 (1941).
04 Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule, 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8371
(1964) (hereinafter cited as 1964 Statement of Basis).
60 Id. at 8365 (emphasis supplied).
66 Id.
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disobeying the lato."" Hence the FTC has refrained from explicitly
classifying the rules as either legislative or interpretative."
The classification of the Rules, however, must depend not upon
their labelling by the FTC but upon their effect on a respondent at an
adjudicative hearing. When the FTC has reason to believe that there is
a violation of the laws it administers, it may summon the allegedly
responsible party to appear at such a hearing." At the hearing, the
Commission performs the role of a trial court, adjudicating the issues
and determining whether a cease-and-desist order should issue." The
FTC, then, applies its own rules in the first instance. The Commission
has already announced to what degree it intends to rely upon the Trade
Regulation Rules at a hearing: it will adopt not only the legal con-
clusions embodied in the Rules, but also their factual underpinnings,
and regard both as conclusive for its purposes." Such reliance, it is
submitted--and the remainder of this note seeks to provide grounds
for this conclusion—requires that the Rules be categorized as legislative
rules.
It is true that the Commission's proposed reliance upon the legal
content of the Rules is not in itself grounds for classifying the Rules
as legislative, since it is consonant with the FTC's role as a trial court."
When any court considers an administrative rule which is less than
legislative in stature, it is free to adopt the legal conclusions expressed
in the rule." The rule is not thereby said to "have the effect of law"
and to become a legislative rule; it is still an interpretative rule to
which a court has decided, in its discretion, to "give the effect of law"
in a particular case. The weight that the court may give to such a rule
will depend upon a variety of factors." It may be objected that since
the FTC in this case performs the roles of both rule-maker and judge,
the so-called substantive Trade Regulation Rules are in fact legislative,
it being more likely than not that the FTC hearing examiner will adopt
his agency's prior interpretation of the law as expressed in the Rules.
The Rules are still not conclusive in this sense, however, because FTC
adjudications are subject to appellate review." An appellate court may
67 Id. at 8371 (emphasis supplied).
68
 Id. at 8365, 8371. The FTC resists further classification than "substantive." Id.
at 8365-66.
06
 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970). The procedure for an FTC hearing Is set forth in 16
C.F.R. Part 3 (Supp. 1972).
7° Id.
71
 The nature of reliance in both cases is specified in 1964 Statement of Basis, supra
note 64, at 8371.
72 Id. at 8371-73.
78 O'Neill v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 359, 363 (N.D. Ohio 1968) (quoting 1
Davis, supra note 57, 5.05, at 315).
74 "The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in . . . the consideration given the rule], the validity of its rea-
soning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 140 (1944). See 1 Davis, supra note 57, § 4.11, at 358.
76 Review of an FTC order is available In a Court of Appeals of the United States,
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approve of the FTC's use of a rule as an interpretation of FTCA law,
but it may also discard the rule completely and render its own inter-
pretation of the disputed legal issues. After all, it is well settled that
it is for the courts, not the Commission, to determine ultimately what
law the Commission administers." In other words, the FTC cannot
insulate legal conclusions previously drawn by the Commission from
the appellate review specifically provided for in the FTCA. 71 Hence the
FTC's reliance upon its prior interpretations of the law as expressed
in the Rules does not classify the Rules as legislative as long as appel-
late courts can fully review that interpretation.
However, the Commission has proposed that it may rely not only
upon the legal content but also upon the factual findings underlying
the Trade Regulation Rules. One of the arguments it has advanced in
support of this proposition is that courts have approved its reliance
upon its Trade Practice Rules." The difference, it is said, between
Trade Practice Rules and Trade Regulation Rules is merely one of
degree, not kind." This argument is manifestly incorrect. Rather, it is
submitted that the difference between the two should help to reveal
why it is necessary to class the Trade Regulation Rules as legislative. It
may be true that the Commission is justified in relying upon the legal
content of Trade Regulation Rules as it has done with Trade Practice
Rules. However, Trade Regulation Rules, unlike Trade Practice Rules,
are accompanied by supportive factual conclusions.s° When the hearing
examiner presiding at an FTC adjudications' relies upon a Trade Prac-
tice Rule, he is simply accepting prior agency interpretation of the law.
Because a Trade Practice Rule is not accompanied by factual conclu-
sions, the Commission cannot utilize a Trade Practice Rule to resolve
an issue of fact or to dispense with the introduction of evidence required
to make out a prima facie case." Any factual conclusions which under-
lie a Trade Practice Rule must be proven de novo. 88 In contrast, if a
hearing examiner relies upon a Trade Regulation Rule, as the FTC has
proposed that he be able to do, not only will he follow the legal con-
clusions embodied in the Rule, but he will also adopt—as conclusive—
within any circuit where the method of competition or the act or practice in question
took place or where the respondent resides or carries on his business. Such review is final,
subject to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari. 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970).
70 FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934); FTC v. Gratz, 253
U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
77 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970),
78 Trade Practice Rules are strictly interpretations of the laws administered by the
FTC. Since the Commission's publication of its views in the 1964 Statement of Basis,
Trade Practice Rules have been replaced with Industry Guides, which perform the same
function. 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 & n.1 (Supp. 1972). The old Trade Practice Rules are still on
the books. 16 C.F.R. II§ 18-228 (1972).
7° 1964 Statement of Basis, supra note 64, at 8363-73, 8370 (1964).
80 Id. at 8371.
81 16 C.F.R. § 3.42 (Supp. 1972),
82 1964 Statement of Basis, supra note 64, at 8371.
88 Id.
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the accompanying factual conclusions which were made at a prior rule-
making proceeding." The difference in the impact of the two types of
rules is consequently a radical one.
What, then, is the FTC's justification for such reliance upon the
Trade Regulation Rules, if the Rules—as the Commission has asserted
—are not to be classified as legislative and, therefore, are not to require
the explicit congressional authorization which the National Petroleum
court found lacking in the FTCA? If the Commission's intended use
of the Rules can not be justified, such use would violate an important
procedural right of respondents summoned for alleged violations of the
Rules, the right to a full hearing on all the issues to which respondents
are entitled by both the APA 88 and the FTCA." A full hearing means
that every party should have the right to present his case or defense
by oral or documentary evidence, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to
conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true
disclosure of the facts." Such a hearing is essential to ensure an in-
formed and just application of the authority of administrative boards
and agencies." However, by relying as it proposes to do upon the
factual conclusions underlying a Rule, the Commission would avoid the
usual full hearing and so reap two distinct advantages: first, it would
no longer be required to introduce evidence to support those conclu-
sions; and second, a respondent would be foreclosed from rebutting the
factual conclusions with evidence of his own. The remainder of this
casenote will weigh in some detail both the Commission's rationale for
avoiding the full hearing guaranteed to respondents by statute and the
impact such avoidance would have on procedural rights. It will be sub-
mitted that the rationale fails; that the impact on procedural rights of
the Rules as the Commission proposes to use them requires their classi-
fication as legislative; and that the nature of that impact on procedural
rights underlines the correctness of the National Petroleum holding that
rules having such an impact require clear congressional authorization.
The FTC seeks to justify the circumvention of the usual rules of
evidence as to the introduction of factual conclusions drawn at a prior
rule-making proceeding by invoking a variation of the doctrine of
judicial notice." Under this doctrine, courts possess the discretion to
allow the introduction of pertinent general facts without affording the
non-introducing party the opportunity to cross-examine." This general
prerogative, nonetheless, is subject to strong limitations. It is usually
said that the factual matters introduced must either be so notorious
that the production of evidence would be unnecessary, be within the
judge's acquaintance as judge, or be capable of instant and unquestion-
B4 Id.
86 5 U.S.C.	 554 (1970).
86 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
87 United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 202 (1956).
88 Id.
88 1964 Statement of Basis, supra note 64, at 8372.
°° See C. McCormick, Evidence §§ 323-31 (1954).
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able demonstration.' The sort of factual matters which the FTC sought
to "notice" through its reliance upon the Trade Regulation Rules
plainly do not meet these criteria 0 2 The Commission, moreover, claims a
broader discretion in an administrative agency's use of "official notice"
than in a court's exercise of judicial notice. Official notice, as defined
by the FTC, may be taken of any facts embodied in the record of a
prior Trade Regulation Rule rule-making proceeding as long as those
facts are what are known as "legislative" facts." "Legislative" facts, as
distinguished from "adjudicative" facts, are typically general facts
which help a tribunal decide issues of law and policy." In contrast,
"adjudicative" facts concern the immediate parties. These facts inform
the tribunal as to who did what, where, when, how and with what
motive or intent." Such facts may be established only in an adjudicative
setting. In general, facts which may be judicially noticed are narrower
in scope than "legislative" facts." While the limitations on official
notice are not as stringent as those which control judicial notice," the
reaction of the courts to this extension of the doctrine of notice is bound
to be hostile."
Beyond the question of whether the FTC may permissibly take
official notice of the legislative facts embodied in the Trade Regula-
tion Rules, there is a more fundamental objection to the FTC's pro-
posal to rely upon the factual conclusions which underlie those Rules.
The Commission maintains that a respondent does not have an un-
qualified right to introduce evidence in rebuttal of officially noticed
facts."' The FTC justifies this startling proposition on the ground
that only respondents who had ample opportunity to engage in the
prior rule-making proceeding, at which the particular rule was pro-
mulgated, would be foreclosed from further challenge of the facts
noticed.'" According to the Commission, if the particular respon-
pi E.g., In re Knapp-Monarch Co., 296 F.2d 230, 232 (C.C.PA. 1964) (quoting 9
J. Wigrnore, Evidence § 2571, at 547-48 (3d ed. 1940)).
02 Underlying the rule in the instant case, for example, are conclusions regarding the
consuming public's conception of the octane rating of gasoline, the true nature of the
rating, the buying habits of the public, the needless expense entailed in purchasing grades
of gasoline superior to what is actually required, etc. These factual conclusions are set
forth in 36 Fed. Reg. 354-65 (1971).
93
 1964 Statement of Basis, supra note 64, at 8371-72. The FTC has adopted the
theories of "official notice" and "legislative facts" propounded by Professor Davis. See 2
Davis, supra note 57, § 15.01, 15.03. Davis has in turn approved the application of
his theories by the FTC, calling the 1964 Statement of Basis "one of the most out-
standing administrative opinions of the twentieth century." 1 Davis, supra note 57, § 5.04,
at 128 (Supp. 1965).
94 2 Davis, supra note 57, § 15.14, at 433.
98 Id.
96
 Id. § 15.01.
97 See, e.g., Dayco Corp. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 180, 186 (6th Cir. 1966).
99 Id. Facts, to be officially noticed, ought to be "of a general nature, representing
generalizations distilled from repeated demonstrations." F. Cooper, State Administrative
Law, Ch. XII, § 5, at 413 (1965) (emphasis supplied).
99 1964 Statement of Basis, supra note 64, at 8372.
100 Id.
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dents had a prior opportunity to marshal evidence in opposition at
the rule-making proceeding there is no reason to provide them with
a second chance at the adjudicative hearing."' The FTC contends
that one opportunity to participate is all the opportunity which the
APA requires."'
Refusal to allow evidence in rebuttal of officially noticed facts
reveals the precise nature of the Trade Regulation Rules as the Com-
mission proposes to use them. This factor, it is submitted, ultimately
determines whether the Rules are legislative or interpretative. The
Commission seeks to characterize the Rules as less than legislative
in nature while using the Rules to preclude a respondent from the
safeguards guaranteed by the APA"' and the FTCA 104 for an adjudica-
tive hearing. In so doing, the Commission exposes its hand: the Rules
are legislative. The proposed Trade Regulation Rules do indeed have
the effect of substantive law.
The APA specifically states: "When an agency decision rests
on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence
in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an oppor-
tunity to show the contrary."'" This statutory provision is in accord
with established law.'" The Commission, at an adjudicative hearing,
would permit the respondent to introduce rebuttal evidence as it
pertains to facts officially noticed, only if those facts were adjudica-
tive.107 If the respondent has been afforded the opportunity to chal-
lenge legislative facts at the prior rule-making proceeding, he would
be foreclosed from further challenge of those facts when officially
noticed at the adjudicative hearing.'" This position, it is submitted,
is tenable only when the rule being applied is a legislative rule pro-
mulgated pursuant to a clear delegation of authority from Congress.
A respondent does not have the absolute right to challenge the
facts which underlie the formulation of legislation; the factual un-
derpinnings of a legislative rule are foreclosed from further contest.
This is the reason for the strict requirement that potential respon-
dents be given notice and an opportunity to be heard when legislative
facts are settled at a rule-making proceeding.'" Interpretative rules,
on the other hand, are based upon facts which are open to collateral
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Those safeguards are listed in 5 U.S.C. f I 354, 556 (1970).
104 IS U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
105 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1970). This provision has been incorporated into the FTC
Rules of Practice in substantially the same form. 16 C.F.R. § 3.43 (Supp. 1972).
100 "(Nlotice . . has no other effect than to relieve one of the parties to a con-
troversy of the burden of resorting to the usual forms of evidence ... `It does not mean
that the opponent is prevented from disputing the matter by evidence if he believes it
disputable.'" Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 301-02
(1937) (citations omitted). See 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2567 (3d ed. 1940).
107 1964 Statement of Basis, supra note 64, at 8372-73.
108 Id.
109 See 5 U.S.C. § 533 (1970).
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attack at later adjudicative hearings. Accordingly, the APA exempts
proceedings wherein interpretative rules are formulated from the no-
tice and hearing requirements necessary for the promulgation of legis-
lative rules.1 " Trade Regulation Rules, then, as they are envisioned
by the FTC, must stand or fall as legislative rules111—there can be
no other explanation for the FTC's proposal to adopt their underly-
ing factual determinations as conclusive in adjudicative hearings.
This conclusion should not be modified by the fact that the
FTC gratuitously affords the public the opportunity to participate in
Trade Regulation rule-making procedures conforming to APA require-
ments."2
 The prescription of such rule-making procedures cannot take
the place of the missing congressional sanction to promulgate legis-
lative rules."2
 The FTC must first meet the threshold question of
whether the legislature has delegated to it the authority to issue rules
of such effect: public participation in the rule-making procedures
cannot make up for a lack of such explicit authorization.
The serious gaps in the logic of the FTC's argument are em-
phasized, not remedied, by the decisional law upon which the Com-
mission depended in the 1964 Statement of Basis. The FTC cited
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co. 114
 and Federal Power Com-
mission v. Texaco Inc. 1" as authority for the contention that through
its rule-making power it may foreclose a respondent from challeng-
ing the officially-noticed factual conclusions which underlie its rules.""
In Storer, the petitioner owned five licensed television broadcast sta-
tions. The Federal Communications Commission dismissed, without
hearing, his application for a license for an additional station. The
agency justified its action on the grounds that its rules provided,
in effect, that it would issue no license for an additional station to
any party already owning five stations. Although the right to a full
hearing was guaranteed by statute, 17
 the petitioner was limited to
challenging the application of the rule to the particular factual situa-
tion; the petitioner could not challenge the basis of the rule itself. 112
110 "Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not
apply—(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice . . ." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1970).
111 Wegman, although a staunch supporter of FTC authority to promulgate Trade
Regulation Rules, recognizes that the rules are'truly legislative. Wegman, Cigarettes and
Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 Cornell L. Rev. 678, 742 & n.291 (1966).
112 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
113 This is the sort of "bootstrap" argument which the National Petrokum court
refused to endorse. 340 F. Supp. at 1350.
114 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
115 377 U.S. 33 (1964).
ne 1964 Statement of Basis, supra note 64, at 8372.
117 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1964).
118 351 U.S. at 200-06. The Court held that the FCC's regulations permitted ap-
plicants to show the inapplicability of its rules, but the Court placed the burden upon
Storer to set forth reasons sufficient to justify a change or waiver of the rule. Id. at 205.
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In other words, the petitioner was precluded from contesting the
legislative facts upon which the rule was based."'
In Texaco the respondents had applied to the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) for a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity to supply natural gas to a pipeline. Since the applications dis-
closed price clauses impermissible under FPC regulations, the FPC
rejected the applications without a hearing. Following the Storer de-
cision, the Court held that the agency could specify statutory stan-
dards through its rule-making process and bar at the outset those
whose applications neither met those standards nor showed why, in
the public interest, the rule should be waived.' 2° Again, the party con-
cerned was precluded from attacking the legislative facts supporting
the rule.
Courts, then, have allowed agencies to perform their regulatory
duties through the use of rule-making powers, eschewing the full ad-
judicative hearings otherwise guaranteed respondents. And the choice
made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc
litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the
administrative agency."' But such a choice only exists when both
methods are available to the agency."' In the two cases discussed
above, the far-reaching rule-making power was found to be autho-
rized by a delegation of legislative authority."' As held by the Na-
tional Petroleum court, the FTC can point to no such delegation of
authority.
Absent congressional authorization, the Commission can not insu-
late fact findings from challenge by respondents at adjudicative hear-
ings by making those findings at prior rule-making proceedings.
Indeed, such a procedure is inconsistent with the spirit of the pro-
nouncements of the Supreme Court in National Labor Relations
Board v. Wyman-Gordon Co.'" In that case, the Labor Board had
ordered the respondent to furnish a list of names and addresses of
employees eligible to vote in an upcoming representation election.
The Board based its order on a "rule" announced in a prior adjudica-
tion involving another respondent."' The Court, although it affirmed
the Board's order on other grounds, held that rules, that is, exer-
119 See text accompanying notes 107-08 supra.
120 377 U.S. at 39-40.
121 SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).
122 Burrus & Teter, Antitrust: Rulemaking v. Adjudication in the FTC, 54 Geo. L.J.
1106, 1127 (1966).
123 "[The FCC is empowered to make] such rules and regulations and prescribe
such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this chapter ...." 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1964) (emphasis supplied).
"[The FPC is empowered to] perform any and all acts, and to prescribe, issue,
make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and regulations as it may find necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 717(o) (1964)
(emphasis supplied).
124 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
125 Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
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cises of quasi-legislative power, must be promulgated at rule-making
proceedings only, in accordance with the requirements of the APAl 26
The rule-making provisions of the APA "may not be avoided by the
process of making rules in the course of adjudicatory proceedings. "127
Wyman -Gordon is, of course, factually distinguishable from Na-
tional Petroleum. However, the rationale which supports the former
case forcefully applies to the latter. In National Petroleum, the FTC
simply attempted the converse of what the Labor Board was forbid-
den to do in Wyman-Gordon. Instead of avoiding rule-making pro-
cedures by promulgating a "rule" at an adjudicative hearing, the
FTC sought to avoid the safeguards attending adjudicative procedures
by relying on "evidence" introduced at a prior rule-making pro-
ceeding. Both agencies attempted to make use of one procedure to
effectuate what should properly be accomplished through another pro-
cedure, thereby defeating the substance of the Act. The use of the
Trade Regulation Rule procedures would be in accord with the APA
only if it were authorized by a clear delegation of legislative power. 128
Until it is, however, reliance by the FTC upon such rules would
vitiate the procedural rights of respondents at cease-and-desist hear-
ings.
In summary, the legislative history of the FTCA indicates that
section 6(g), the only section which explicitly authorizes rule-making,
pertains only to housekeeping or procedural matters. In order to ful-
fill the congressional mandate to prevent unfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair or deceptive acts and practices, the Commission must
depend upon the principal method of enforcement specified in Sec-
tion 5(b) of the Act: case-by-case adjudicative process. The Com-
mission cannot infer a far-reaching rule-making power on the slim
authority of the wording of its general purpose clause, especially in
the light of an adverse legislative history.
These conclusions are based upon the premise that Trade Regu-
lation Rules have the force and effect of substantive law. If they did
not, they would be mere interpretative rules not requiring specific
statutory authority and not prohibited by the National Petroleum
holding. The Rules, however, do possess the effect of substantive law
and must be classified as legislative rules owing to the effect which
the FTC intends to give them at adjudicative proceedings. By re-
fusing a respondent the right to challenge the officially noticed facts
which underlie a particular Trade Regulation Rule, the Commission
denies the respondent his statutory rights to a full hearing on all the
126 394 U.S. at 763-66.
121
 Id. at 764 (emphasis supplied).
128
 A bill is presently before the Senate which would grant the FTC this power in
the consumer area. Included in a proposed replacement for section 6(g) would be the
words: "The Commission is hereby authorized to issue legislative rules defining with
specificity acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive to consumers . . . ." Title II
of the Consumer Product Warranties and Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,
S. 986, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 206 (1972) (emphasis supplied).
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issues. While case law indicates that rules may legally be given such
conclusive effect, this is true only when legislative rules are promul-
gated pursuant to a delegation of authority from Congress. The FTC
can point to no such authority. In essence, the Commission, in reach-
ing for the best of both worlds, has constructed a hybrid rule, one
which is "interpretative" in the sense that its legality may be based
on tenuous authority, but which is "legislative" to the extent that it
operates to foreclose a respondent from questioning its factual basis.
EDWARD J. M. LITTLE
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